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Abstract
Background: Transfers of money and help with daily activities by family and friends are important sources of
support for older people and contribute to their well being. On the other hand, older adults are not only recipients
of support but also important providers of support and financial transfers as giving and receiving are often reciprocal.
For this, it is important to understand the determinants of receiving and giving money and help as well as the
relationship between these two.
Methods: The aim of this paper is to explore the relationship between giving and receiving of the same or of different
types of transfers as well as to get more insights in the motivation behind giving and receiving of money gifts or informal
care. We use data from the Survey of Health Aging and Retirement in Europe and employ a multinomial logit model to
analyse 16 different categories resulting from combining information on the incidence of giving and receiving of both
informal care and financial gifts.
Results: We show that despite the differences that exist in the incidence of giving and receiving of both informal care
and financial gifts there are clearly a few patterns that are consistent between the European countries in our analysis.
Both ‘altruistic-like’ and ‘exchange-like’ motives are more likely to increase by age, gender and physical proximity of
network members, while ‘reciprocal-like’ giving and receiving is more likely among females and those with a network
at close distance.
Conclusions: Our results show that the incidence of informal care and gifts to and from older people is related to
particular characteristics and transfers patterns. Further research should be dedicated to exploring the situations leading
to the ‘altruistic-like’ and ‘exchange-like’ combinations of transfers.
Keywords: Informal care, Informal gits, Older people, Europe, SHARE data
Background
With an ageing society the provision of care and support
to older people who are less able to look after them-
selves has become an issue of concern [1–6]. With the
increasing pressure on long-term care expenditures,
informal care delivered by family and friends is seen as
one of the main factors to ensure the sustainability of
care systems [7, 8]. Previous research has shown that in-
formal care may contribute to reducing the growth in
total care expenditures as it may reduce the use of for-
mal care and delay admission to nursing homes [3, 9,
10]. However, formal and informal care are not always
perfect substitutes to each-other [11] and often support
provided by family members complements rather than
substitutes for formal arrangements [12]. Moreover, in-
formal solidarity arrangements are frequently based on
the notion of reciprocity and mutual giving and receiv-
ing: you give care now in the expectation that you will re-
ceive care back when needed [13, 14]. It is also recognized
that older people are frequently not only the recipients of
support but also important support providers [15]. For
this reason, receiving and giving of the informal care is
often correlated. The same can be said for financial
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transfers, people who are likely to give may also be
more likely to receive and vice versa [15, 16]. Given the
complex nature of informal support transfers between
family members and older people, it is important to
understand the main patterns and determinants of
receiving and giving as well as the motivation behind
such transfers.
This paper aims to increase our knowledge and insight
on informal solidarity arrangements and the patterns of
transfers as well as the motivation behind giving and
receiving of monetary transfers from and to people older
than 50 years old in Europe. We explore who gives and
who receives informal care and who gives and receives
monetary transfers in Europe and how these transfers
are related to each other. Moreover, we are interested in
exploring the links between giving and receiving of the
same or of different types of transfers. For instance, are
those who receive informal care or money more likely to
also provide them to others. And, if not, what types of
transfers are provided together, and what transfers are
provided in return? We account for all the potential
combinations that exist between the receiving and
giving and also account for the differences between
different European countries (given the different formal
solidarity arrangements that exist in each of these
countries).
Theoretical considerations behind helping others
The complexity of the motivations behind informal gifts
and care to family members has attracted the attention
of researchers from various fields. The main explana-
tions on the motives and the extent of such transfers
have been mainly sought at the individual and policy
level. At the individual level, these relate mostly to the
motives behind providing gifts and care whereas at the
policy interest research has focused on the availability of
the publicly provided formal care arrangements, (as it is
often argued that the formally provided care and the size
of the welfare state can discourage such transfers).
Psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists and econo-
mists have explored the individual motives and the
dynamics of transfers. In fact, arguments sustaining the
motivation behind informal giving to family and friends
have always orbited around altruistic and non-altruistic
motives [17–28] (see also Serge-Christophe Kolm [29]
for a more comprehensive review of the motives behind
transfers and their classifications). Altruistic motives
have been more popular among non-economists in
explaining prosocial behaviour (giving to others in situa-
tions when there are no immediate or visible gains). In
social sciences and social psychology altruistic motives
are broadly identified with acts that decrease the direct
fitness of an actor while benefiting one or more
recipients [30, 31]. However, in the last decades altruistic
motives have become more accepted also among econo-
mists. Gary Becker, for instance, argued that there is
something else beyond self-interest and this is related to
genetic selection and altruism [18, 20]. The economic
literature describes the altruism model as a model where
for example parents care for the wellbeing of their
children, or in other words they receive utility not only
from their own consumption but also from consumption
of their children. Consequently, the parent may choose
to transfer resources to needier family members because
of altruism. A distinguished feature of this model is the
fact that over the lifetime a needy member of the family
will receive more than she gives. If this hypothesis is
empirically corroborated, then some characteristics of
the needy receiver should be directly related to the
extent of gifts and care (like a drop in income, a sudden ill-
ness leading to psychological or financial dependency, etc.).
Non-altruistic arguments for informal gifts and care,
on the other hand, are mostly related to normative
motivation (like moral obligations), social effects (as
derivative of praise, esteem or gratitude [32]), social rela-
tions and social status of the giver, or simply self-interest
[29]. In this later case, the costs involved with the giving
are expected to be compensated (or even overcompen-
sated) directly to the giver. There are different theoretical
explanations for the motivations behind self-interested be-
haviour but the more predominant ones are the ‘exchange’
theory [23, 27, 33–35], the ‘strategic bequests’ motives
[36–38] and ‘reciprocity’ [14, 17, 39, 40]. For instance,
Cox [41] in trying to test altruism empirically using data
from the US President's Commission on Pension Policy
Survey sustained the ‘exchange’ theory. He suggested that
utility of the giver is not only dependent on the consump-
tion of both herself and the recipient (as the altruism
model suggests), but also depends on services received by
the recipient. The types of services referred to by Cox are
mostly help to the donor (parents in his case) with home
produced goods. The basic concept is that people pursue
their self-interest through exchanging within the family
and that this is enforced by explicit economic incentives.
On the other hand, Bernheim et al. [42] have looked at
the ‘strategic bequest’ motive focusing on bequests that
parents leave to their offspring (children support their
old-age parents so they can receive money/property after
their death). Exchange can take the form of a ‘delayed
exchanged’ (parents invest in children when they are
young and they “repay” back when grown up), and the
‘direct exchange’ (children and parents exchange goods
and support in the same time – e.g., services for transfers).
Another prominent non-altruistic motivation behind
informal giving and receiving is also ‘reciprocity’. This is
usually defined as “treating the others the same way they
did treat you, just because of this particular fact and not
as a result of an expected or pre-agreed exchange” [14].
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Polanyi [43] has been one of the first researchers in
social sciences to stress the point that reciprocity in
gift giving differs from the strictly market exchange
in economics. The difference with the concept of
exchange (‘quid pro quo’) is that reciprocity proceeds
from a set of “internal” obligations (e.g. to give, to
receive, and to give back) driven by norms or collective
values, and group or social pressure [14, 44]. In fact,
Kolm argues that a family is neither a ‘paternalistic
entity’ á la Becker and nor an ‘exchange entity’ á la
Chiappori,1 but it represents a dense and intense
network of various reciprocities in sentiments and
conduct. In this context, the commands and exchanges
are embedded in larger relations of reciprocity among
the family members [14].
At the policy level, the expansion of the welfare state
during the past 50 years has led to an increase in formal
and institutionalized care and support arrangements
financed by compulsory solidarity contributions in the
form of tax and social insurance premiums [45]. This
has resulted in a rapid increase in the cost of health
care and social support systems [7]. Consequently, many
countries try to shift away from solidarity arrangements
based on entitlements to formal care and encourage
forms of informal solidarity arrangements based on
voluntary and in kind contributions. However, due to
the informal and voluntary nature of informal care and
private gifts, governments are much less able to ensure
that sufficient care and social support is available than in
the institutionalized and formalized care and support
settings. The extent and generosity of the welfare system
and the intervention of the state also influence the
extent of informal arrangements, and hence the extent
of private services and money transferred privately. A
substitution effect of private transfers/help by publicly
provided help would support the “crowding-out” theory
[46]. Yet, many studies on intra-family transfers [47–50]
have observed that even in those countries where such
public transfers/services are available, private transfers
do not completely disappear [51]. This raises questions
on how much informal help is provided, who provides
this help, who receives it, to what extent are the
receivers also providers of help, and how much is this
different across countries with different systems for
provision of formal care.
Methods
We use data from the fourth wave of the SHARE data-
base [52, 53]. SHARE covers various aspects of life and
health of the population aged 50 years or older. The
total sample for the European countries in wave 4
included 58,489 individuals. The data were gathered in
2010 and 2011 in 16 European countries (Austria,
Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France,
Denmark, Switzerland, Belgium, Czech Republic, Poland,
Hungary, Portugal, Slovenia and Estonia) [52, 53].
SHARE provides information on informal help and
care, financial gifts to and from members outside the
household and various indicators of the social network
[52, 53]. The decision to use the fourth wave of SHARE
(rather than the more recent fifth wave) was based
primarily on the availability of the physical proximity
variables and the possibility to link this information to
particular members of the network. The distance proxy
is particularly important as many studies have shown
that geographical distance may represent an important
cost factor that could significantly influence the amount
of informal care delivered, [10, 11] and therefore
decreases the contact with people in the network [54].
For validity purposes, we also test our results separately
using data from the fifth wave (collected in 2013 for
14 European countries - Austria, Germany, Sweden,
Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, Switzerland,
Belgium, Luxembourg, Czech Republic, Slovenia and
Estonia – and Israel), using pooled data from the fourth
and fifth waves. We also test our results on panel data
constructed from both waves four and five of the SHARE
data (all the results are presented in the Additional file 1:
Tables S3 – S5).
In SHARE, the questions on informal care ask about
personal care or practical household help given or re-
ceived to/from any persons outside the household (from
a family member, friend or neighbour) to the respondent
or the partner.2 SHARE also asks about the financial or
material gifts larger than 250 Euros given or received
to/from any persons within or outside the households
(including money, or transfers to cover for specific types
of costs like medical care, schooling, a down payment
for a home, etc.). Based on this information, the main
dependent variables in our study are two: (i) a dummy
variable on receiving and giving informal care from/to
the persons outside the household in the last 12 months
before the interview, (ii) a dummy variable on whether
the respondent received or gave financial gifts of more
than 250 Euros.
Receiving and giving are often correlated to each other,
i.e., people who are likely to receive are also often like to
give and vice versa. Yet, people who receive and give
transfers may be systematically different from those who
do not. If receiving and giving are estimated separately
the correlation between them is not captured and this
may also increase the risk of having biased estimators.
To address this problem we employ a unique approach
by creating a 16 cells matrix which combines the giving
and receiving of both informal care and financial gifts.
Hence, in terms of informal care, one could neither
receive nor give it, only receive it, could only give it, or
both receive and give it. The same could be said for the
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financial gifts. This gives us the opportunity to create a
new variable capturing every possible combination, (as
shown in Table 1) between the giving and receiving (or
not) of informal care and gifts.
After this transformation our dependent variable could
fall within any of the categories in Table 1 representing
any of the combinations of transfers. For instance,
category 1 ‘neither care – neither financial’ corresponds
to individuals who declared to ‘neither receiving nor
giving informal care’ and ‘neither receiving nor giving
financial gifts’. Our outcome of interest Y could take any
n values such as n = 1,2,3,…16.
In terms of hypothesis testing, we were interested to
check for evidence supporting either ‘altruistic’ or the
‘non-altruistic’ theories. For instance, if receiving a type
of transfer is not associated with the giving of another
type (e.g. ‘receives care – neither financial’; ‘gives care-
neither financial’; ‘neither care – receives financial’;
‘neither care- gives financial’) this supports a more altru-
istic motive behind the transfers. On the other hand, the
‘exchange’ theories are supported more if receiving is
conditional on giving (such as in ‘receives care – gives
financial’ or ‘gives care - receives financial’). Instead, the
‘reciprocity’ theory is supported more if we observe
giving and receiving of the same type (i.e., ‘both care –
neither financial’ or ‘neither care – both financial’).
We were also interested in checking the main charac-
teristics that are associated with giving and receiving.
For this we assume that Xi is a vector of exogenous vari-
ables, like age, gender, household size, having the partner
in the same household, instrumental activities of daily
living (IADL) scales, having been hospitalized in the last
12 months, income quintile, employment status, the
share of people in the network living less than 5 km
squared away, and country of residence. The choice of
these variables was based on the availability of them in
the SHARE data as well as on previous studies which
have shown that they all affect the probability of
informal care or gifts to other family members or
friends [2, 9, 11, 47, 49, 55–58]. Furthermore we as-
sume β ið Þ is a set of vectors of parameters that cor-
respond to each of the outcomes specified in Table 1
(for each i = 1,2,3. …,16). Our focus is on checking
how the relationship between giving and receiving
differs by age, gender and distance to the relatives
and friends. To control for all these factors we esti-
mated a multinomial logit regression [59, 60] such
that the probability πið Þ for each of the outcomes
i ¼ 1; 2; …; 16ð Þ is determined as:
π1 y ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ e
Xβ 1ð Þ
eXβ
1ð Þ þ eXβ 2ð Þ þ…þ eXβ 16ð Þ
π2 y ¼ 2ð Þ ¼ e
Xβ 2ð Þ
eXβ
1ð Þ þ eXβ 2ð Þ þ…þ eXβ 16ð Þ
……
π16 y ¼ 16ð Þ ¼ e
Xβ 16ð Þ
eXβ
1ð Þ þ eXβ 2ð Þ þ…þ eXβ 16ð Þ
ð1Þ
For comparative purposes, we set the outcome num-
ber 1, ‘neither care – neither financial’, as the reference
category. Hence, if we set β 1ð Þ ¼ 0 the other set of coeffi-
cients simply measure the change relative to y ¼ 1, and
the probabilities will be estimated as:
π1 y ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ 1
1þ eXβ 2ð Þ þ…þ eXβ 16ð Þ
π2 y ¼ 2ð Þ ¼ e
Xβ 2ð Þ
1þ eXβ 2ð Þ þ…þ eXβ 16ð Þ……
π16 y ¼ 16ð Þ ¼ e
Xβ 16ð Þ
1þ eXβ 2ð Þ þ…þ eXβ 16ð Þ
ð2Þ
And the relative probability of outcome i to the refer-
ence outcome 1 (neither-neither):
πi y ¼ ið Þ
π1 y ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ e
Xβ ið Þ i¼1;2;3: …;16ð Þ ð3Þ
One of the limitations of the SHARE dataset is that it
only indicates that a relative or friend (e.g. as a partner,
Table 1 The ‘matrix-like’ transformation of the giving and receiving variables
Informal care: neither
receives nor gives
Informal care:
only receives
Informal care:
only gives
Informal care: both
receives and gives
Financial gift: neither receives nor gives (1) Neither care & Neither
financial
(2) Receives care & Neither
financial
(3) Gives care & Neither
financial
(4) Both care & Neither
financial
Financial gift: only receives (5) Neither care & Receives
financial
(6) Receives care & Receives
financial
(7) Gives care & Receives
financial
(8) Both care & Receives
financial
Financial gift: only gives (9) Neither care & Gives
financial
(10) Receives care & Gives
financial
(11) Gives care & Gives
financial
(12) Both care & Gives
financial
Financial gift: both receives and gives (13) Neither care & Both
financial
(14) Receives care & Both
financial
(15) Gives care & Both
financial
(16) Both care & both
financial
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child, mother or father, other relative, friend, etc.) was
involved but it does not identify the specific person who
gave or received money or help. Therefore we cannot
link the information on specific transfers (giving and re-
ceiving of informal care or financial gifts) to a specific
person. This may limit the interpretation of our results
on the altruistic or non-altruistic theories as: (i) we are
not sure if respondents are referring to the same person
to/from whom they gave and received, and (ii) we cannot
control for characteristics of persons who are providing
(or receiving) care or gifts. To overcome the first problem
we check the validity of the results by repeating the same
analysis for distinct groups of relatives, namely: the
children, close relatives, other relatives and friends (results
for children are given in the Additional file 1: Table S2
and all other results are available from the authors).
Results
Descriptive statistics
We have data on a total number of 35,249 individuals
who reported on both receiving and giving of informal
care and financial gifts in the last 12 months. Table 1
shows that giving financial gifts (of 250 Euros or more)
and giving informal practical help or personal care to
persons outside the household had the highest overall
mean incidence when the data for all countries are
pooled together: 24.4 % of all respondents have given
financial gifts and 19.0 % have provided help or care in
the last 12 months. The table also shows that a relatively
small share of the respondents both gives and receives
informal care (5.6 %) or both gives and receives financial
gifts (3.1 %).
A relatively large share of respondents (46.5 %) be-
longs to the ‘neither care – neither financial’ group as
they neither give nor receive informal care and neither
give nor receive financial gifts. On the other hand, there
is a much lower share of respondents at the other
extreme ‘both care – both financial’ as only 0.5 % of
them give and receive both informal care and financial
gifts. Another interesting trend is also the share of re-
spondents that fall under ‘gives care – neither financial’
which is about 10.6 % of sample. Similarly, people who
fall under ‘neither care – gives financial’ accounted for
13.5 % of the total sample.
A more detailed overview for each of the countries is
given in Additional file 1: Table S1. Our data show that
there are no clear patterns between countries and there
is a relatively large heterogeneity in terms of patterns of
receiving and giving informal care and financial gifts be-
tween countries in Europe. In general, Northern and
Western European countries have higher incidences of
giving care or financial gifts while Southern and Eastern
European (SEE) countries in receiving them. Hence,
countries like Denmark, Sweden and Netherlands have
higher incidences than the mean in’giving care – neither
financial’ while Austria, Germany, Sweden and
Switzerland have higher incidences for ‘neither care –
giving financial’. Denmark, Germany and Sweden also
have higher incidences for ‘receiving care – giving finan-
cial’. SEE countries have instead the highest incidences
for ‘receiving care – neither financial’ (Spain, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary) as well as ‘neither care –
receiving financial’ (Italy, Estonia, Poland).
Determinants of receiving and giving informal help and
care
Table 2 shows the results of the multinomial model
for selected variables including age dummies, gender
and share of social network members living within
5 km squares (a complete table of results is provided
in Additional file 1: Table S3).
The results show that older age cohorts (between 65
and 75 or higher than 75 years old) are more likely to
receive help from outside the household (see Table 3A
and B) compared to those younger than 65 years old. At
the same time these older cohorts are less likely to give
help outside of the household or receive and give financial
help. An interesting trend is that the coefficient for the
category ‘receives care – neither financial’ increases with
age indicating that informal care received increases with
age even if no financial transfers are given in return.
However, so does the coefficient for the category
‘receives care – gives financial’, which especially for indi-
viduals older than 75 years increases quite substantially
and becomes statistically significant at the 99 % confi-
dence level. The results show that for both age categor-
ies giving of financial gifts is associated with receiving
informal help (‘receives care – gives financial’). For the
other categories coefficients are either negative or not
statistically significant.
‘Reciprocity’ of informal care (‘both care – neither
financial’) appears to decrease with age, probably due to
the fact that the old age cannot provide much informal
care in return.
Results for gender show that women are more likely
than men to receive and give practical help and care
outside the household, as well as give and receive finan-
cial help (though the results for giving financial gifts
were not statistically significant). The result for the
coefficients of category ‘receives care – neither financial’
is positive and statistically significant and so is the
coefficient for ‘receives care – receives financial’ showing
that women are more likely than men to receive either
just care or both care and financial help. Interestingly,
the coefficient for ‘receives care – gives financial’ is not
statistically significant whereas ‘gives care – receives
financial’ is positive and statistically significant showing
that women may be more likely than men to give care
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and receive financial help rather than the other way
around. This may be related to the fact that women may
have less financial means to provide financial help to
others.
However, despite the lower probability for financial
transfers, women appear to be more ‘reciprocal’ than
men in both informal care and financial gifts. Both coef-
ficients for categories ‘both care – neither financial’ and
‘neither care – both financial’ are positive and statisti-
cally significant.
Having a larger share of network members in a dis-
tance closer than 5 km squares increases the probability
of both receiving and giving informal care and also giv-
ing financial gifts but does not always have a statistically
significant effect on receiving financial help. Again, it is
interesting to note that having a larger share of social
network members closer than 5 km increases both the
probability of ‘receives care – neither financial’ and
‘receives care – gives financial’. This shows that people
with a higher share of their network living nearby are
more likely to receive informal care either “in return”
for financial gifts or not. Closer proximity of the
network members also increases ‘reciprocal’ informal
care as the coefficient for the category ‘both care –
neither financial’ is positive and statistically significant
at 99 % confidence level.
The effect of other control variables is as expected (see
Additional file 1: Table S3). Hence, having a partner in
the household generally reduces the probability of
receiving and giving both care from outside and financial
help. Similarly, a larger household size reduces the prob-
ability of getting help from outside the household and
increases the probability of giving/receiving help inside
the household. Having been in the hospital during the
last 12 months and having limitations with IADL has
more or less the same effect on help and care (increasing
the probability of receiving help from outside and inside
the household and reducing the probability of giving
help outside the household – but yet not inside the
household). In general, being retired, unemployed, receiv-
ing disability benefits or being a homemaker decreases the
probability of giving financial help compared to being
employed. This is to be expected as these groups have in
general less disposable income than the employed. This
result is also supported by the results on the particular in-
come quintiles (the lower four quintiles were less likely to
have given financial help compared to the highest one).
The results for the country dummies show that there
does not exist a clear pattern between countries. Re-
sponders in some Central European and SEE countries (like
Switzerland, France, Portugal, Spain, Hungary, Slovenia)
have a higher probability of receiving informal care help
both when giving and not giving financial transfers (i.e., the
‘receives care – neither financial’ and ‘receives care – gives
financial’ categories) if compared to others, but as men-
tioned, the patterns are not consistent over the countries.
The validity checks on the particular transfers from and
to children (see Additional file 1: Table S2) mainly confirm
the results from the total sample with the only difference
that here the categories ‘receives care – receives financial’
(especially for people older than 75 years old) becomes
positive and statistically significant at 99 % confidence
level. Results show that the relationship with children is a
usually oriented towards receiving care either together
with receiving and giving financial gifts or not (i.e.,
coefficients for categories ‘receives care - neither financial’;
‘receives care - receives financial’; ‘receives care - gives
financial’ are positive and statistically significant) but less
in giving care.
In order to further check the robustness of our results
we have also run our models on the cross-sectional data
from the fifth wave of SHARE, on a pooled sample from
waves four and five and on the (unbalanced) panel data
from waves four and five. It should be noted that some
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics: the incidence of giving and receiving care and financial help
Informal care: neither
receives nor gives
Informal care:
only receives
Informal care:
only gives
Informal care: both
receives and gives
Total
Financial gift: neither receives nor gives 0,465 0,087 0,106 0,030 0,688
(0,007) (0,004) (0,004) (0,003) (0,006)
Financial gift: only receives 0,017 0,007 0,009 0,004 0,037
(0,002) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,003)
Financial gift: only gives 0,135 0,027 0,065 0,016 0,244
(0,005) (0,003) (0,003) (0,002) (0,006)
Financial gift: both receives and gives 0,014 0,002 0,010 0,005 0,031
(0,001) (0,000) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002)
Total 0,631 0,123 0,190 0,056
(0,007) (0,005) (0,005) (0,004)
Standard deviations in brackets
Tomini et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2016) 16:603 Page 6 of 11
of such models were run without one (i.e. the variable
for geographical proximity of the network members) or
more of the original independent variables. All results
were consistent with our findings (see Additional file 1:
Tables S3 – S5) and confirm the robustness of the rela-
tions presented here.
Table 3 Selected coefficients of the multinomial regression model for selected variables
Informal care
Fin. gifts Neither receives nor gives Only receives Only gives Both receives and gives
A Age between 65 and 75 years old (ref: younger than 65)
Neither receives nor gives - 0.166b −0.363c −0.220c
(0.068) (0.050) (0.085)
Only receives −0.146 0.052 −0.479c −0.373
(0.122) (0.202) (0.174) (0.252)
Only gives −0.024 0.262b −0.461c −0.372c
(0.049) (0.117) (0.066) (0.121)
Both receives and gives −0.049 0.406 −0.637c −0.674c
(0.130) (0.248) (0.156) (0.186)
B Age older than 75 years old (ref: younger than 65)
Neither receives nor gives - 0.934c −1.012c −0.546c
(0.066) (0.067) (0.100)
Only receives −0.508c 0.106 −1.129c −0.787c
(0.149) (0.208) (0.240) (0.301)
Only gives −0.083 0.804c −1.220c −0.469c
(0.058) (0.117) (0.099) (0.141)
Both receives and gives −0.228 0.397 −1.328c −1.128c
(0.166) (0.274) (0.248) (0.251)
C Gender: female
Neither receives nor gives - 0.312c 0.235c 0.253c
(0.049) (0.039) (0.067)
Only receives 0.431c 0.857c 0.613c 0.874c
(0.097) (0.183) (0.130) (0.206)
Only gives −0.098c 0.090 0.164c 0.183b
(0.037) (0.082) (0.049) (0.085)
Both receives and gives 0.237b 0.667c 0.528c 0.301b
(0.096) (0.203) (0.109) (0.139)
D Share of people in the social network living less than 5 km away
Neither receives nor gives - 0.402c 0.497c 0.621c
(0.057) (0.053) (0.084)
Only receives −0.050 0.419b 0.200 0.222
(0.125) (0.178) (0.169) (0.227)
Only gives 0.127b 0.593c 0.482c 0.538c
(0.053) (0.102) (0.071) (0.117)
Both receives and gives 0.231a −0.029 0.498c 0.615c
(0.139) (0.239) (0.152) (0.182)
Pseudo R-squared (0.114)
Number of observations (35,363)
Other control variable included: ‘household size’, ‘having the partner in the same household’, ‘self-perceived health score, ‘activities of daily living (ADL) scale’, ‘having
been hospitalized in the last 12 months’, ‘income quintiles’, ‘employment and retirement status’, and a list of dummies for the country of residence.; Standard deviations
in brackets; asignificant at 10 %; bsignificant at 5 %; csignificant at 1 %
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Discussion
Receiving and giving informal care or financial help are
not necessarily separate acts. They depend on the con-
text, which includes the motivation behind the act of
helping and the availability of alternative forms of help,
such as formal care, insurance coverage and social trans-
fers. Personal motives are usually divided in altruistic
reasons (the willingness to give informal care or financial
transfers when observing a need or any other valid rea-
son for helping without expecting anything in return)
and non-altruistic reasons (when giving is based on the
expectation that the costs involved will be compensated
to the giver at some point in time). Previous research
has also highlighted that the extent of solidarity in a
society may also be linked to the formal provision of
long-term care since state intervention may (partially)
contribute to a ‘crowding-out’ of private transfers [46].
Yet, informal and formal care are not perfect substitutes
[11, 12] and moreover, people who receive care are also
important support providers [15, 61]. This paper has ex-
plored the complex nature of informal care and financial
help transferred by and to older people taking into ac-
count the reciprocal nature of informal transfers as well
as the differences that may exist across the 16 European
countries in the SHARE database.
The data used in this study came from a cohort of
people aged 50 and plus [52, 53]. Despite the older age
of the participants in the sample, our results show that
the informal giving of personal care to persons outside
the household or financial gifts is the most prevalent
transfer. This confirms the hypothesis that this popula-
tion group remains an important support provider [15]
in all the countries in the survey. In fact, previous
studies have found that monetary transfers within a
family flow primarily from older to younger generations
[2, 23, 25, 27, 47, 62, 63]. Albertini et al. [47] show that,
though the probability of giving decreases at very old age,
even the individuals above 70 years old remain net givers.
Our findings suggest that the elderly (especially
categories over 75 years old) are also important receivers
of informal care and this is “divided” between those who
give financial and receive care (‘receives care – gives
financial’) and those who receive care without giving
any financial gifts (‘receives care – neither financial’).
While the later finding would support a more ‘altruistic’
motive behind transfers, the earlier finding suggests an
‘exchange’ motive. Previous studies have documented
that elderly parents are more likely to give financial gifts
to children providing informal care [13, 23, 33, 58] but
that also there may be things beyond the pure ‘exchange’
theory [27]. In fact, the conclusion about the ‘altruistic’
motives should be interpreted more cautiously as relations
among the members of social networks tend to be more
dynamic and also change over time (e.g. relatives may
have provided care or gifts to each-other in the past
or may do so in the future). Moreover, the absence of
formal care arrangements may elicit caregiving activities
by others. The lack of adequate formal arrangements
has been argued to be a driving factor for informal
caregiving especially in Eastern [64] and Southern
European countries [47]. On the other hand, the
widespread availability and extent of formal care and
support programs may crowd out the need for infor-
mal care. These two factors may explain regional
differences in informal caregiving [65]. Several of the
countries in this study have formal support programs
in place where, for instance, children or volunteers
are compensated for their time spent in caregiving
activities. However, the set-up, conditions and bene-
fits of the support programs differ between countries
[2, 55, 65]. It is argued that the existence of such
interventions together with the socio-economic
differences may also change social norms and the
way people help each-other [65].
One other important determinant of informal care
we examine here is gender. We find that elderly women
are less likely to experience ‘exchange-like’ transfers
(‘receives care – gives financial’) and more likely to
receive ‘altruistic-like’ transfers (‘receives care – neither
financial’ and ‘receives care – receives financial’). Previ-
ous studies have indicated that women are more likely
to behave altruistically than men [66]. However, this
result may also be related to the fact that women are
more disadvantaged financially than men and therefore
have less financial means. Our results show that women
appear to be important providers of informal care as
they are more likely than mean to provide care either in
the presence of gifts ‘gives care – receives financial’ or
not ‘gives care – neither financial’.
Women are also more likely to be ‘reciprocal’ than
men in both informal care and financial gifts as they are
more likely to simultaneously receive and give informal
care without receiving or giving financial (and the other
way around). Previous studies also have shown that
there may be gender differences when it comes to reci-
procity [67].
An important factor in giving and receiving informal
care is also physical proximity with the members of the
social network. In fact, we find here that distance mat-
ters for both receiving and giving informal care and for
the ‘reciprocity’ of such transfers.
In terms of cross country differences, our results show
that the incidence of informal care remains high even in
those countries where long-term and old-age care
services are almost entirely based on public provision of
formal care and support (like in the Scandinavian countries
and the Netherlands). In fact, data from 2012 on long-term
care expenditure show that countries like the Netherlands,
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Sweden and Denmark are among the countries with the
highest share of expenditure on long-term care as a
percentage of GDP (with Netherlands spending a total of
about 4.1 % and Sweden and Denmark 3.7 and 2.6 respect-
ively) [68]. The Czech Republic, Estonia and Portugal on
the other hand are amongst the countries spending the
lowest share of GDP (0.2 to 0.3 % of the GDP) with expen-
ditures in the other countries somewhere in between [68].
The numbers on the incidence of informal care to some
extent go against the theory of the ‘crowding-out’ of private
transfers. In fact, previous studies [11] have shown that, for
instance transfers between children and parents are less
frequent in Southern European countries compared to the
Nordic countries (Sweden and Denmark) but they can be
more intense in nature [47]. The same studies show that
the Continental European countries are somewhere in
between the two, which is also confirmed by our results.
Yet, we could not identify any distinguished patterns be-
tween countries when it comes to the association of infor-
mal care and financial gifts. Previous studies have also
found similarities in terms of transfers patterns of money
and care between the European countries [15, 47]. This
confirms that despite the differences there may be some
common patterns when it comes to who receives more
and how are the transfers of informal care and financial
gifts interrelated with one-another.
Conclusions
The results of the analysis in this paper show that des-
pite the differences between the selected European
countries, the overall incidence of transfers of informal
care and financial gifts remain high among the 50 plus
years old. Moreover we have shown that there are a few
clear patterns among European countries in terms of the
interrelation of giving and receiving informal help and
financial gifts. The general positive relationship between
giving informal care and receiving financial gifts suggest
some form of ‘exchange’ between the elderly and their
relatives. On the other hand, the positive relationship
between receiving informal help without transferring
financial gifts suggest other motivations that go beyond
the exchange theory. We also found that the combina-
tion(s) of giving and receiving is more enhanced with
age, gender and physical proximity of the relatives
and friends. However, ‘reciprocal-like’ of the same
transfers are more likely for women and relatives with
a closer distance network.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to study the
different combinations of receiving and giving of infor-
mal care and financial gifts using nationally representa-
tive data for people 50 year plus in multiple European
countries. From a policy perspective, our results show
that the motives behind giving and receiving may not be
influenced much by the different arrangements of formal
care available in the countries included in our analysis.
Yet, more attention should be paid to how such relations
change depending on the type of care delivered and the
intensity of informal care. Our results call also for more
attention on analysing the effect of informal help espe-
cially among certain groups like older generations, the
worse off, as well as people having a more physically
distant social network. Further research should be
dedicated to exploring the situations leading to the
‘altruistic-like’ and ‘exchange-like’ combination of trans-
fers. This is especially important as the ‘exchange-like’
transfers may be much more prone to the ‘crowding-out’
effect on both ends, i.e., both from the giver and the
receiver perspectives.
Endnotes
1See also Chiappori [21] and Browning et al. [69].
2SHARE also provides information on the regular
(daily or almost daily during at least three months)
personal care (washing, getting out of bed, or dressing)
given or received to/from any persons living in the same
household. However, this is mostly provided between the
households members and therefore it was not of interest
for this paper.
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